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**Department  of  Sociology,  UCLA INTRODUCTION.  We have constructed some preliminary  comparisons involving 
present-day  immigrants  and natives, as well as their children, based on the 1990 Census.  In 
particular  we are interested in whether the prognosis for the second generation  is as grim as 
recent discussions  of “second generation  decline” and of “segmented assimilation”  would warn 
(we discuss these theories  at length in an earlier Institute working paper). 
This paper presents something of a preliminary  answer; however its major focus lies 
elsewhere, namely  in stressing the need to drop the comparison  of native and immigrant  offspring 
as too crude to be of any use, whether  for analytic  understanding  or for policy  formulation.  The 
‘Hispanic’ and ‘Asian’ classification  is only marginally  preferable; indeed, the reason it is 
preferable  at all will be made clear by our argument for a different kind of distinction. 
The crucial distinction,  is between the Mexican immigrants  and all other immigrants.  We 
do not claim that no other immigrant  groups are as disadvantageously  situated as the Mexicans. 
However, the Mexicans  are not only disadvantageously  situated, they are also by far the largest 
group of immigrants,  and an even larger proportion  of the second generation  -- of the children  of 
immigrants  growing up in the United States.  If the Mexicans are distinguished  from the others, 
the effect is to see that the non-Mexican  immigrants  and their children are much better off than 
might  otherwise  appear -- and the resulting  comparisons to native-born  whites and their children 
is especially  instructive.  Assuredly,  some relatively  large immigrant  groups other than the 
Mexicans are in trouble, however, their numbers are simply swamped by the still larger immigrant 
groups that are more happily  situated economically. 
Needless to say (we trust), in pointing  out these trends, we are not presenting  an argument 2 
about Mexican  culture or character; our finding reflects the fact that the Mexican  immigration  is 
both the very largest and the most uniformly  comprised of people who come as unskilled  or 
semiskilled  workers, with relatively  little education, job  skills, or capital.  Nor is this observation 
in itself any recommendation  as to policy  along the Mexican border; that the Mexican immigration 
has this job profile  must be seen, at a minimum,  in the context of the need for low-skill jobs  in the 
American  economy.  Our wish is not to take a stand on legislation  to alter the immigrant  mix  but 
simply to show that thinking  about that mix somewhat differently  than has been common will be 
very helpful in understanding  the social reality. 
THE  EVIDENCE.  Several crucial subgroups can be identified  in the  1990 Census Public 
Use Samples (PUMS: two datasets that include 5% or 1%  of the American  population 
respectively). 
a) Children  O-l 7 living  with  their  parents.  We followed Lief Jensen in selecting all 
children  living with a parent who was an immigrant head of household.  Notice that this sample 
includes children born abroad (members of the “first generation” themselves,  as are their 
immigrant  parents) as well as the more numerous children born in the United States (members of 
the true “second  generation”).  These children  were drawn from the 5% PUMS.  We compared 
them to a sample  of all children  living with native-born  parents found in the  1% PUMS. 
Moreover, we subdivide the native-born  by race.  For this working paper, we used subsamples 
of the relevant  samples, so that the sampling ratios of subsample to U.S. population  are l/200  for 
the children  of immigrants  and l/2,000  for the children of the native born. 
We made one change from Jensen’s selection criteria: we included those whose parents 
were born in Puerto Rico.  These are  not ‘immigrants’ in a legal sense, but they still an important 5 
group of arrivals.  While this usage may seem quite quixotic, it should be appreciated that had we 
classified the Puerto Ricans with the “native-born”  all the contrasts that we highlight  below, in 
Tables 4-8 would have been stronger than they appear in the tables.  In other words, our 
classification  of the Puerto Ricans with immigrants tends to ‘stack the deck’ against our 
arguments. 
The sample we have described thus far is useful in giving us a profile  of the immigrant 
households  of origin, in which the children of immigrants  grow up,  but it is less useful for the 
study of extended education or full-time work information,  since those experiences  apply to an 
older cohort. 
b) Young adults 18-2.5 living with parents.  We also selected all children living with an 
immigrant  parent who were between the ages of 18 and 25.  These individuals  are much more 
likely to be at work or in college, which is just as revealing).  But these are not a representative 
group of all children  of immigrants  in the age range, since many over 17 have left their parents’ 
homes. 
c) Young adults who had been brought to the U.S. before reaching age 5.  Had the 
census asked about the respondents’  parents’ place of birth, we could have studied those children 
who had left their parents’ homes directly.  Since the Census did not ask that question, we have 
resorted to indirect  evidence  of second-generation  attainments  with which to supplement  sample 
(b).  We studied what Ruben Rumbaut has called the ‘1  Sers’: we define these here as foreign- 
born individuals  of age 18-25  who had arrived in the United States before their fifth birthday. 
The procedure  can be used only for a very narrow set of ages and dates of arrival, but it is 
nevertheless  revealing  of much wider trends, since this group of arrivals should be quite similar to 4 
the group of children  of the same age born to immigrants who had already reached the United 
States (with the one exception  of the Indochinese  representation  among the  ‘ 1.5ers’, to be noted 
later).’  probably  not too much  separates the ‘1.5ers’ from native-born  children  born in the same 
immigrant  groups in the same year. 
Thus, we study two imperfect  samples of 18-25 year-old  children  of immigrants:  young 
adults living with parents (b above, who are both native-born  and foreign-born),  and young  adults 
brought to the U.S. before reaching  age 5 (c above, foreign-born  by definition).  In addition,  we 
can compare  some characteristics  of these groups to a more perfect sample of younger  children  (a 
above), especially  with regard to immigrant origin and to indicators  of family well-being. 
For the sake of clarity, the list that follows indicates in one place which  samples, a, b or c, 
are found in each table. 
Text  Sample 
tables  type 
C 
a,  b, c 













’ We could determine  age of arrival indirectly,  by subtracting year of arrival from  1990, to 
obtain years in U.S., and then by subtracting the result from the respondent’s  age to learn age at 
arrival.  The procedure  was complicated  by the fact that the Census did not ask respondents  for 
the exact year they had arrived, but only in which 5-year range of years they had arrived.  Thus 
there are many  individuals  who might have been eligible for our sample, but we could not be 
certain that they had arrived when they were less than 5 years of age, rather than at age 6 or 7, for 
example; all these uncertain  cases were excluded from the sample. 5 
CLASSIFYING  IMMIGRANTS  BY  ORIGIN.  In the following  tables we have tried to 
classify immigrants  and their children by country of origin in such a way as to retain both large 
groups and groups which differ in important ways.  We all know that if we focus on Iranian 
immigrants  and on the Hmong we will find dramatic differences in well-being,  and be able to show 
that not all immigrants  face the same experience.  However, the Iranians  and Hmong together 
account for barely  1% of all immigrants;  the issue, then, is how much difference we find among 
groups that comprise  larger proportions  of all immigrants. 
We have therefore  created categories  for Mexicans,  Puerto Ricans,  Caribbeans,  other 
Hispanics, Indochinese  other Asians, Europeans and Canadians and all others.  These distinctions 
could surely be revised.  For example, 30% of the Caribbeans  are from Cuba; perhaps  (given their 
distinctive  patterns  and their size) the Cubans should be treated separately.  Nevertheless,  refining 
the groupings  would have no effect on the major point of this paper, and so we adopt the 
grouping  for present purposes without more elaborate discussion. 
Table Aa in the appendix shows the countries included  in each aggregate category  of 
national  origin (e.g. in “Other Asian”), as well as the number of sample members from each 
country.  The countries from which appreciable numbers have come are identified  by name and 
the rest by  1990 PUMS birthplace  code. 
A FEW  PRELIMINARIES.  Table  1 shows the percentage  of individuals  living with their 
parents in sample type c (‘ 1.5ers’ and all natives of age 18-25).  Roughly half of the cohort is 
found in a parent’s home,  and the proportion  varies from group to group.  Clearly,  to depend 
exclusively  on the sample of those  18-25 living at home (sample type b)  would be risky. 6 
However, by comparing results from that sample and from sample c of ‘1.5ers’ we can verify  that 
the general pattern of results we discuss below usually holds in both samples of young people  (in 
sample c as well as in sample b).  As such, we limit most discussion in the text, in connection 
with the crucial tables 6-8, to the sample of young people living with their parents and leave the 
confirming  evidence  from the sample of 1.5ers to the appendix (tables A6-A8). 
Certainly,  we not expect the b and c samples to show identical patterns;  at a minimum, 
the b sample (children  18-25 who were living with a parent) will be younger  on average than the c 
sample (all  ‘ 1.5ers’  18-25).  Moreover, the sample of the  1.5 generation  is affected by the nature 
of its selection,  limited  as it is to a very narrow range of ages and arrival times.  In particular,  the 
Indochinese  arrivals, who came during a narrow band of years are virtually  absent from the 
sample of 1.5ers (the first two columns of the table).  .  We will not, therefore,  be able to 
compare the accuracy  of the b and c samples with regard to the Indochinese.  There are also 
more Puerto Ricans in this sample of 1.5ers and fewer children of European and Canadian  origin, 
whether because of trends in the ages of immigration,  the likelihood  of having  started to raise 
children  abroad, or the pattern of flow from each country. 
The second, third and fourth columns of Table 2 all refer to children  of the household 
head; the columns differ in terms of the age of the children.  Consequently,  the differences  across 
columns reflect the changing flows of immigration  over time.  Of course, the difference  across 
columns also reflect any differences in ethnic propensities  for young people to leave their parents’ 
homes in the 17-25 age range, but it is unlikely  (as Table 1 confirms) that the large shifts from 
oldest to youngest  cohort is due to such a factor; the pattern  of change in the composition  of the 
immigrant  pool is also seen in more muted form between the youngest  and middle  cohorts.  The 7 
proportion  of children whose families  had come from Europe or Canada dropped from a 
surprisingly high 27% for immigrant families with children  18-25 to 17% for families with children 
l-9.  At the same time, the proportion  of children  of Mexican  origin rose from 24% to 32%. 
These are large and important  changes, and none of the other shifts were of remotely  comparable 
magnitudes. 
Finally,  Table 3 shows the percentage  of the children of immigrants  in each group who 
were themselves  born abroad.  This percentage varies from group to group, reflecting  both 
recency of bulges in the migration  flow, the timing of marriage and childbirth,  fertility  and the like. 
The dramatic rise in the percentage  foreign-born  by age presumably  reflects these factors too, 
and especially  the fact that older children were more likely to be the first children born into the 
marriage,  before  an immigrant  couple arrived.  However, this table suggests that the fraction  of 
Mexican  chiZdren born  abroad  was  not high  enough  to explain much of the Mexican 
disadvantage  we find in Tables 4-8. 
COMPARZSONS OF FATHER  ‘S OCCUPAl7ON,  POSTSECONDARY  SCHOOLING. 
AND  EARLY  JOBS.  We can present in one section all three of our crucial comparisons  --- 
because the observations  we wish to make largely hold across all three measures of well-being, 
Our major focus is the economic well-being  of the children of immigrants.  However, 
much of what we can glean from direct evidence can be reinforced  by indirect evidence  -- 
specifically  about the economic well-being  of the children’s families of origin and about the 
children’s  extended schooling. 
Consider first, in Tables 4-5,  the family of origin for children O-l 7 years of age; we 
examine the occupations  of the father (or if father absent, of the mother).  And we will compare 8 
children  of the  immigrant  groups  we  have  already  identified  with  the  children  of native-born 
blacks,  whites  and  others. 
There  are numerous  ways  in which  we might  measure  the  relative  levels  of economic  well- 
being  of these  groups;  even  having  settled,  as we have  in this  paper,  on the  occupational  stratum 
of the  father  as the  criterion,  there  are numerous  ways  in which  we  can  compare  the  distribution 
across  strata.  We  focus  first  on the  percentage  of gainfully  employed  in each  group,  and  in then 
on the  distribution  of the  gainfully  employed  across  three  levels:  high,  middle  and  low  end 
occupations.  Under  higher  strata  occupations,  we  include  the  fathers  (or mothers)  working  in 
managerial,  professional  or technical  occupations.  Under  middle-strata  jobs  we  include  skilled 
manual  work,  clerical  and  sales jobs.  Under  lower  skilled  occupations  we  include  the  fathers 
working  in service,  low  manual  and  farming  (chiefly,  no  doubt,  farm  laboring)  occupations.  And 
finally,  when  no  occupation  is listed  for a parent,  the  father  is classified  under  “no  occupation.” 
Compare  first  all immigrant  parents  and  all native-born  parents  -- the  first  row  of the  table 
and  the  fourth  row  from  the  end.  The  immigrant  parents  are slightly  worse  off:  Table  4 shows 
that  82%  of the  immigrants  are gainfully  employed,  compared  with  85%  of the  native-born 
parents;  and  Table  5 shows  that  of the  gainmily  employed,  28%  of the  immigrant  parents  are 
found  in the  higher  strata,  38%  in the  lower  strata,  whereas  among  the  natives  the  comparable 
proportions  are 3 1% and  32%.  Nevertheless,  the  occupational  distributions  do  not  strike  one  as 
radically  different. 
How  large  a difference  is  ‘radically  different?’  Consider  blacks  and  whites  as a rough 
yardstick  for  comparisons:  blacks  and  whites  do differ  ‘radically’  (by American  standards  of social 
differences)  on many  measures,  and  our measures  are no  exception.  Among  the  native-born 9 
white parents, 89% were gainfully  employed,  among the native-born  black parents only  66%. 
And despite this staggering difference, in gainful employment,  those that were employed  still 
differed considerably  in their occupations:  32% of native-born  whites were in high strata 
occupations,  and 30% in low strata occupations;  among native-born  blacks, the figures were  19% 
and 48%. 
The point we wish to stress, with these measures of black-white  difference  in mind, is that 
no less notable  contrasts among immigrant groups exist as well.  And since the Mexicans  are by 
far the single largest immigrant  group, and are very likely to enter at or near the bottom  of the 
occupational  ladder, distinguishing  between them and all others is very telling.  The percentage 
gainful employment  is not a measure of this disparity between Mexicans and all others: 83% of 
non-Mexican  immigrants  are employed,  and 8 1% of Mexicans.  However, among the gainfully 
employed  (Table 5), 37% of the non-Mexican  household  heads are in higher strata occupations, 
and 29% in lower strata occupations,  whereas the figures for Mexican immigrant  heads are 8% 
and 6 1%.  Thus the contrast among the gainfully  employed between Mexican  and all other 
immigrants  is much starker than between the gainfully  employed native-born  blacks and whites. 
Of course, part of the reason  for this starker contrast among immigrants  is that so many more of 
the native born black families are headed by the unemployed  or by individuals  not in the labor 
force.  However,  even if we were to draw the contrast differently  -- considering  together the 
unemployed,  those not in the laborforce  and those working in the low strata occupations  -- then 
65% of the native-born  blacks, and 67% of the Mexican immigrants  would be in that low-end 
category;  on the other hand, 40% of the native-born  whites and 41% of the non-Mexican 10 
immigrants  would be in that category.2  Or to put it differently,  when calculated  in the manner 
just indicated,  the Mexican and non-Mexican  positions  among the foreign-born  are virtually 
identical  to the black and white positions respectively  among the native-born. 
While the Mexican  case is the most striking example of the need to distinguish  groups of 
immigrants,  we can appreciate the nature of the immigrant diversity  still more if we now subdivide 
the non-Mexican  immigrants  in the manner noted at the outset.  Employing  this distinction 
reveals that while the “Hispanic” category is dominated by the large number and the extreme 
pattern  of the Mexicans,  other Hispanics  groups are better off -- with the exception  of the Puerto 
Ricans.  Nor is the more favorable position  of these non-Mexican  Hispanic immigrants  due 
simply to the relative  well-being  of the Cubans; on the contrary, the Caribbeans  (30% of whom 
are Cubans) and the “other Hispanics” are very similar in their occupational  distributions,  and 
both are considerably  better off than the Mexicans -- with 24-25% in the higher  strata and 40- 
41% in the lower strata as against 8% and 61% for the Mexicans.. 
Among the “Asians,” the internal  contrasts are also striking.  The Indochinese  form one 
large subgroup of similar experience and all other Asians -- Chiefly Filipinos,  Taiwanese, Koreans 
and other Pacific Rim countries as well as Indians, Iranians, and so on -- form a far more 
advantaged  group (Table 5).  While the Indochinese  are much less numerous  than the other 
Asians, they do comprise 20% of all Asian immigrants.  Finally,  among those O-17 in 1990, it was 
still the case that the children  of Europeans  and Canadians were four-fifths  as numerous  a group 
as the children  of Asians and this group too was relatively  well-off. 
2.  Calculated  as follows:  (a*b)+c+d where a=% of the employed  in low strata (shown in 
Table 5) b, c, d = %s of all who are employed, unemployed,  and not in labor force respectively 
(shown in Table 4).  Thus for native-born  blacks: (.48*.66)+.10+.23  = .65. 11 
These observations  about the groups’ comparative  levels of well-being  also hold when we 
look at the children  of immigrants  themselves.  Table 6 shows the prevalence  of post-secondary 
schooling  among the groups.  Among Mexicans,  18-25 years of age, 7% had the equivalent  of a 
college  degree (completion  of 16 or more grades of schooling),  44% had dropped  out before 
completing  grade  13, and another 28% were still in school, in a grade lower than  13.  Among 
non-Mexican  immigrants,  these proportions  were generally more favorable  than among native 
whites.  Note, by the way, that even with Mexicans included, the children  of immigrants  do not 
appear to differ much from the children  of the native-born.  There may be a second generation 
decline, there may be a segmented assimilation;  but if we ask whatpercent  of all children of 
immigrants  are on the wrong  side of the tracks, it would appear that the percentage  among the 
immigrants’  children is not particularly  different than the percentage  of the children  of the native 
born by this measure. 
One grim difference  between the relative  standing of the groups on fathers’ occupations 
and on schooling  of the children.  Whereas the black parents’ jobs were somewhat  better 
situated than those of the Mexicans, the children’s  schooling  reverses that relative  standing.  The 
‘advantages’ of the somewhat preferable black (compared to Mexican) occupational  situation,  as 
judged  by Table 5, does not carry over to the schooling  of the children;  in that regard, the more 
somber realities  shown in Table 4, dealing with the percentage  of children  growing up in a 
household  with a gainfully  employed parent, must be recalled. 
Otherwise the situation is rather like that already discussed in connection  with Table 5; 
notice in particular  that only  17% of other Asians have left school without reaching  post- 
secondary  grades (36% for native whites). 12 
And finally,  the Census figures permit a look at the jobs  of the second generation.  Many 
are still enrolled  in postsecondary  schooling.  Some of the rest also lack an occupation  (of these, 
no doubt, some are in high school).  These tables (7-8, A7-A8) will repay examination.  For the 
limited purposes of this paper, we want to stress the immigrant-native  comparison  -- nearly  as 
many children of immigrants  gainfully  employed as children of natives (60% vs. 64%) and more 
importantly,  a somewhat  better occupationa/proJile  even before the children of Mexicans  are 
separated out:  15% of all immigrants’  children are in high strata work and 36% in low; among the 
native-born,  the comparable  figures are 12% and 43% (Table 8).  These figures apply, of course 
only to those living at home, but supporting evidence is found in Appendix  Table A8 for the 
‘1.5er’ generation:  19%/33% all children of immigrants,  17%/40% all children  of natives (and 
Table A7 shows that the proportions  gainfully  employed  are quite similar for these two groups as 
well).  In addition, the children of non-Mexican  immigrants are better situated in terms of these 
occupational  strata than the children  of native-born  whites. 
Finally,  the gap between the children of Mexicans and of non-Mexican  immigrants  is very 
large even by comparison  to the gap between the children of native-born  whites and blacks.  It 
would be a mistake however, to assess the native black employment  situation  on the basis of 
Table 8 (occupational  distribution  of the employed).  Two other perspectives  need to be 
included.  First, Table 7 shows that the percentage  of children of native-born  blacks who are in 
fact employed  is much smaller than for the children of immigrants or native-born  whites (48% as 
against 60-68% for other groups).  Since in every group some of those not employed  are in 
school, the most revealing  way to see the distinctive position  in which the children  of native-born 
blacks are found is to focus on those  18-25 year old youth who are neither  employed  nor in 13 
school:  35% among the children  of native-born  blacks,  14% among the children  of native-born 
whites,  14% also among the children of other immigrants  and 29% among the children  of 
Mexican immigrants.  With this large difference in the percentage employed,  Table 8 indicates 
that blacks and whites who are employed hardly differ at all in occupational  distribution;  yet here 
we need to bring in our second shift in perspective.  Specifically,  we need to remember that 
Tables 7 and 8 pertain  only to the youths  18-25 who are living with a parent.  Tables A7 and A8, 
deal with groups of youths  18-25 years of age in all living arrangements.  Among black youth in 
all living  situations, (Table A8), the black-white  gap is clearer: most notably,  despite great 
differences  in the percentage  without  a job and out of school, among the employed  17% of whites 
and 12% of blacks  are in high  strata occupations. 
In sum to observe the grim reality of the black youth employment,  we need to supplement 
Table 8 with Tables 7, A7 and A8.  If we do so, we can then go on to offer the same sort of 
adjustment  we offered in connection  with the parents’ occupations:  we can take together  (from 
Tables A7 and A8),  1) those in low strata occupations  among the employed,  as well as 2) all the 
unemployed  and 3) those not in the work force or at school.3  Compared  in this way, the 
percentages  of each group found in this unfavorable  position  are: 57% black vs. 44% white for 
the native-born  and 53% Mexican vs. 36% non-Mexican  for the  ‘ 1.5er  immigrants.  In other 
words, even judged  in this way, the situation of Mexican youths is very nearly as unfavorable  as 
that of the blacks, whereas the situation  of all other immigrants  is rather better than that of native 
‘.  See note 2 for the comparable  calculation  with regard to parents’ occupations.  Here 
we take (a*b)+c+d, where a=percentage  employed  in low strata jobs  from Table A8, and b, c, and 
d = percentages  employed  (b), unemployed  (c), and not in labor force or at school (d). 14 
whites.4 
We cannot speak to the impact that the prevalence  of immigrants  might be having  on 
opportunities  for blacks; nor can we speak to the costs and benefits  of immigrants  in a general 
sense to the society.  But with regard to the specific argument that the children  of immigrants 
face serious downward mobility  or blocked  opportunities,  we can conclude  that it is crucial to 
distinguish  the Mexican  situation from that of other groups, and we suggest that other distinctions 
are important  as well -- at a minimum,  distinguishing  the Indochinese  from the other Asian 
populations  and noting the considerable  representation  of relatively  advantaged Europeans  and 
Canadians  in the immigrant pool (although as we have seen their number is lower in the youngest 
cohorts  -- Table 2).  Perhaps most important,  we can also conclude  that the same reasons  for 
making these distinctions  in this analysis are good reasons to think it will be important  to make 
the same distinctions  in many  other contexts of research and policy. 
4. Two artifacts of the data should be recalled here.  First, we have we have included  the 
Puerto Rican migrants  among the group of all other immigrants.  Excluding  them would make 
the contrasts  shown here starker.  Second, the native-born  blacks and whites in Tables A7 and 
A8 include some children of immigrants. T-  I 
TABLE  1.  PERCENTAGE  OF YOUTHS  18-25 WHO WERE 
LIVING  WITH THEIR PARENTS  -- BY ETHNIC ORIGlNS 
Ethnic Origin: *  Living  TOTAL 
‘ 1.5ers  and  with  100%; 
native-born  parents 
% 
N= 
Mexico  55  3,641 
Puerto Rico  46  1,629 
Caribbean  51  1,122 
Europe +Canada  40  I  I  2,730 
All other  I 47  I  630 
Native-born 
black  1  I  48  1,668 
Native-born 
white  I  I  44  10,399 
Native-born 
other  615 
* The ‘ 1.5er’ sample (drawn from the  1990 PUMS) is described in the text.  Ethnic  origin  is 
defined here by birthplace  of the  ‘ 1.5er’ immigrant  youth, and by race for the native-born  youth. 
The rows for ‘all’ immigrants  and ‘all’ native-born  include, in addition to groups shown, small 
numbers of children  from groups not shown separately.  Also, as explained  in the text, 
Indochinese  are excluded due to an artifact of the sample. T-2 
TABLE 2.  THE NATIONAL  ORIGINS OF THE CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS 
Indochina  1  4  5  5 
Other Asian  18  18  19  19 
Europe  +Canada  2 1  27  22  17 
All other  5  2  3  4 
TOTAL (100%) 
N=  13,141  9,395  17,280  22,757 
SOURCE: 5% PUMS data. The second, third and fourth columns  are based on a l/10  subsample 
from this source. 
* For the first column of the table, national  origin refers to the birthplace  of the  ‘ 1.5ers’  (who are 
defined below).  For the second through fourth columns, national  origin refers to the birthplace 
of the household  head (a parent of the sample member). 
** The first column is based on a sample of foreign-born  individuals,  18-25 years of age who 
were brought to the United  States before their fifth birthday.  The second through  fourth columns 
of the table are based on a sample of children, O-25  years of age, living with a foreign-born  parent. 
The children themselves  may be either  native-born  or foreign-born. 
*** The unit of analysis is the child; since the l/10  subsample (used for the second third and 
fourth columns) included  every  10th relevant  child in order of appearance in the 5% PUMS, the 
subsample includes virtually  no siblings (typically  one child per household). T-3 
TABLE  3.  PERCENTAGE  OF  THE  CHILDREN  OF IMMIGRANTS  BORN  ABROAD 
-- BY  AGE  OF  CHILD 
hildren  born  abroad 
See  notes  to Table  2.  All  cell  Ns > 800 except  those  marked  with  asterisk(s): 
* N=689;  ** N=364. T-  4 
TABLE 4. HOUSEHOLD  HEAD’S EMPLOYMENT  STATUS: 
FOR CHILDREN  (AGES O-17) OF IMMIGRANTS 
AND NATIVE-BORN 
Ethnic origin*  Percentage  of group in each emplyment  status 
em-  unem-  n.i.l.f.**  Total  N= 
ployed  ployed 
ALL  82  5  13  100  40,037 
IMMIGRANTS 
Non-Mexican  83  4  13  100  27,875 
immigrants 
SOURCES AND NOTES:  See Table 2. 
*Place of birth of immigrant  household  heads, race for native-born  heads. 
**Not in the labor force. T-5 
TABLE  5.  HOUSEHOLD  HEAD’S  OCCUPATION: 
FOR  CHILDREN  (AGES  0- 17) OF  IMMIGRANTS  AND  NATIVE-BORN 
National  origin*  Occupation  of gainful 
ALL 
NATIVE  BORN  3 1  38  32  100  21,155 
Native-born  black  19  33  48  100  1,980 
Native-born  white  32  38  30  100  18,502 
Native-born  other  24  39  37  100  673 T-  6 
NOTES  TO  TABLE  5. 
SOURCE:  A  l/lOth  subsample  drawn  from  the  1990 PUMS  5%  sample  for  children  of 
immigrants,  and  a 1/20th  subsample  drawn  from  the  1990 PUMS  1% sample  for  children  of 
natives).  See  also  notes  to  Table  2. 
*Place  of birth  of immigrant  household  heads,  race  for native-born  heads. 
** The  gainfully  emp  y  lo  ed are those  listed  in Table  4 as “employed”  (rather  than  as unemployed 
or n.i.1.f.).  The  high-strata  occupations  include  Managers  and  professionals  as well  as technical 
and  supervisory  workers.  The  low-strata  occupations  include  service,  low-skill  manual,  and  farm 
(most  of which  were  assumed  to be farm  labor).  All  other  occupations  were  classified  as 
middling  (typically  skilled  manual  and  clerical  and  sales jobs). 
***The  N’s  in the  last column  refer  to the  number  of gainfully  employed  in the  relevant 
subsamples.  As indicated  above  (sources),  sampling  ratios  differ  by nativity:  l/2000  (1 %*  l/20)  of 
the  actual  population  for  natives,  l/200  for immigrants  (5%*1/10). T-  7 
TABLE  6.  POST-SECONDARY  SCHOOLING OF YOUTHS  18-25 YEARS  OF AGE 






Post-secondary  schooling  (% and N) 
None  Some (but less  16  TOTAL 
than  16 grades of  grades  100%; 
school)  of  N= 
school 
left  in  left  in 
school  school  school  school 
or 
more 
3 1  28  10  24  7  9,395 
27  27  10  26  9  7,142 
ALL 
NATIVE-BORN  3  8  21  12  23  6  5,204 
Native-born black  50  19  12  15  3  775 
Native-born white  36  21  12  25  6  5,126 
NOTES  AND SOURCES.  See Tables 2. 
* Defined by parent’s place of birth for immigrant parents and by race for 
children of the native-born.  The rows for ‘All’ immigrants and native-born  also include  small 
numbers of children  of groups not shown separately. T-8 
TABLE  7.  EMPLOYMENT  STATUS OF YOUTHS  18-25  YEARS OF AGE 
WHO WERE LIVING  WITH THEIR PARENTS:  BY ETHNIC  ORIGIN 
Non-Mexican 
NATIVE BORN  64  9  8  18  100  5,204 
Native-born black  48  15  20  17  100  820 
Native-born white  68  8  6  18  100  4,212 
SOURCES AND NOTES:  See Table 2. 
* Defined by parent’s place of birth for immigrant parents and by race for 
children  of the native-born.  The rows for ‘All’ immigrants and native-born  also include  small 
numbers of children  of groups not shown separately. T-  9 
TABLE 8.  OCCUPATIONS  OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED  YOUTHS 
18-25 YEARS OF AGE WHO WERE LIVING WITH THEIR PARENTS: 
BY ETHNIC  ORIGIN 
Ethnic origin*  I  %  by occupational  stratum  -- and N 
Non-Mexican 
SOURCES AND NOTES:  See Table 2. 
* Defined by parent’s place of birth for immigrant parents and by race for 
children  of the native-born.  The rows for ‘All’ immigrants and native-born  also include  small 
numbers of children  of groups not shown separately. T-  10 
*********  APPENDIX  TABLES  *********** 
TABLE A6.  POST-SECONDARY  SCHOOLING OF YOUTHS  18-25 YEARS  OF AGE: 
‘ 1  .SERS’ COMPARED  WITH NATIVE-BORN  YOUTH 
Non-Mexican 
.  . 
Native-born black  52  14  14  14  3  1,668 
Native-born white  40  15  15  23  10  10,399 
NOTES AND SOURCES.  See Table 2.  Defined by place of birth for immigrant  and by race 
for native-born,  The rows for ‘All’ immigrants  and native-born  also include  small numbers of 
children  of groups not shown separately.  Indochinese  are not shown because the arrival years 
included in the  ‘ 1.5er’ sample saw few very young Indochinese  arrive in the U. S. T-  II 
TABLE  A7  EMPLOYMENT  STATUS OF YOUTHS  18-25 YEARS OF AGE 













NATIVE  BORN 
Percentage  of group in each emplyment  status 
em-  unem-  I not in labor force  I Total  I N= 
ployed  ployed 
not in  in 
school  school 
62  8  13  18  100  13,141 
62  7  12  19  100  5,900 
61  I  11  I 13  1  100  1  3,641 
52  I 11  I 23  I 14  1  100  1  1,629 
69  I  7  I 12  I 12  1  100  I  1,122 
69  I  6  I 15  1  100  1  894 
58  I  4  I 32  1  100  1  2,373 
68  I  6  l 12  I  15  I  100  1  2,730 
I  I  I  I  I 
67  I  8  I 15  1  100  1 12,682 
52  I  14  I  15  I  100  I  1,668 
70  I  7  I 9  14  100  I 10,399 
SOURCES AND NOTES:  See Table 2. 
*Defined by birthplace  of the  ‘ 1.5er  immigrant youth, race for the native-born  youth.  The rows 
for ‘All’ immigrants  and native-born  also include small numbers of children of groups not shown 
separately. T-  12 
TABLE A8.  OCCUPATIONS  OF GAINFULLY EMPLOYED  YOUTHS 
18-25 YEARS OF AGE: 
1  SERS’ COMPARED  WITH NATIVE-BORN 
Ethnic origin *  I  % by occupational  strata  -- and N 
Native-born  white  17  43  40  100  7,227 
SOURCE AND NOTES:  See Table 2.. 
*Defined by birthplace  of the  ‘ 1  Ser’ immigrant youth, race for the native-born  youth.  The rows 
for ‘All’ immigrants  and native-born  also include small numbers of children of groups not shown 
separately. T-  13 
TABLE  AA.  THE  COMPOSITION  OF  THE  ETHNIC  CATEGORIES  THAT  CONTAIN  MORE  THAN  ONE 
NATIONAL  ORIGIN  -- by  1990  PUMS  birthplace  codes,  with  major  groups  identified 
POB  Frequency 
330  1 
331  23 
332  8 
333  35 
334  65 
336  3 
337  Cuba  945 
338  35 
339  Dom  Rep  719 
340  21 
341  5 
342  Haiti  437 
343  Jamaica  484 
344  2 
345  1 
346  7 
348  16 
349  13 
350  20 
351  Trin+To  193 
352  4 
355  3 
358  26 
Percent 
























OTHER  HISPANICS 
310  53 
311  103 
312  El  Sal.  837 
313  Guat.  388 
314  Hond.  179 
316  Nit.  316 
317  Panama  160 
318  15 
375  Argen.  195 
376  53 
377  Brazil  124 
378  Chile  121 
379  Columb.  488 
380  Ecuador  256 
383  Guyana  160 
384  5 
385  Peru  274 
386  4 
387  42 
388  80 























POB  Frequency  Percent 
206  Cambod.  373  19.4 
221  Laos  576  30.0 
242  Vietnam  970  50.5 
OTHER  ASIAN 
200  46  0.6 
CARIBBEAN 
_ 
Cumulative  Cumulative 























53  1.4 
156  4.0 
993  25.6 
1381  35.7 
1560  40.3 
1876  48.4 
2036  52.6 
2051  53.0 
2246  58.0 
2299  59.4 
2423  62.6 
2544  65.7 
3032  78.3 
3288  84.9 
3448  89.0 
3453  89.2 
























3731  96.3 
3773  97.4 
3853  99.5 
3873  100.0 
Cumulative  Cumulative 
Frequency  Percent 
373  19.4 
949  49.5 
1919  100.0 





207  China 
208 
209  Hong  K 
210  India 
211 
212  Iran 
213 
214  Israel 
215  Japan 
216 


































































































47  0.6 
80  1.1 
81  1.1 
107  1.4 
859  11.4 
880  11.7 
1083  14.4 
1969  26.1 
2062  27.3 
2448  32.5 
2538  33.7 
2807  37.2 
3301  43.8 
3388  44.9 
4251  56.4 
4449  59.0 
4451  59.0 
4453  59.1 
4609  61.1 
4619  61.3 
4653  61.7 
4656  61.8 
4657  61.8 
4825  64.0 
6689  88.7 
6712  89.0 
6725  89.2 
6738  89.4 
6815  90.4 
7226  95.8 
7397  98.1 
7463  99.0 
7464  99.0 
7466  99.0 
7480  99.2 
7485  99.3 
7537  100.0 
7540  100.0 T-  1.5 
EUROPE  AND  CANADA 






103  47 
104  16 
105  79 
106  57 
108  27 
109  163 
110  Germany  908 
111  Jl  372 
112  fl  6 
114  fJ  22 
115  2 
116  Greece  323 
117  128 
118  11 
119  221 
120  Italy  858 
123  2 
124  22 
126  200 
127  37 
128  Poland  388 
129  Portug.  384 
130  66 
131  3 
132  113 
133  1 
134  133 
136  60 
137  47 
138  172 
139  Grt  Brt  711 
140  lJ  142 
141  fl  11 
142  II  31 
144  fl  3 
147  Yugosl  204 
180  USSR  245 
182  3 
183  21 
184  14 
300  23 
301  Canada  1260 
304  3 
Cumulative  Cumulative 






































































































































100.0 T-  16 
ALL  OTHER 
POB  Frequency 
060  43 
066  Guam  108 
069  a 
018  42 
079  1 
096  Oth.terr  82 
400  14 
401  4 
403  2 
406  2 
407  1 
408  4 
409  41 
415  Egypt  151 
416  1 
417  38 
420  2 
421  36 
423  2 
425  2 
427  26 
429  24 
430  6 
431  1 
432  1 
434 
436  3: 
437  2 
438  1 
439  1 
440  Nigeria  135 
441  1 
442  1 
444  2 
445  6 
446  1 
447  16 
448  3 
449  South  Af  66 
451  11 
453  14 
454  2 
456  4 
457  16 
459  10 
460  7 
461  10 
462  40 
ALL  OTHER  (CONT.) 
POB  Frequency 
464  3 
468 
469  6' 












































































































1025  80.9 
1026  81.0 
1032  81.5 






















































2.2  1150  90.8 T-  17 
508  3  0.2  1153  91.0 
509  1  0.1  1154  91.1 
510  4  0.3  1158  91.4 
511  3  0.2  1161  91.6 
514  33  2.6  1194  94.2 
517  1  0.1  1195  94.3 
518  1  0.1  1196  94.4 
519  1  0.1  1197  94.5 
522  29  2.3  1226  96.8 
526  41  3.2  1267  100.0 
NOTE: This table is based on the 5% PUMS l/10  subsample for all children  of immigrant 
household  heads 0- 17 (referred to in the text as sample ‘a’). 